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INTRODUCTION 
In their opening brief, petitioners-appellants Andersons demonstrated that the district court 
erred in denying their petition for wrongful lien by: 
1. Construing one sub-section of the Wrongful Lien Act, Utah Code Ann. §38-9-
l(6)(a), in priority over and exclusive to other provisions of that Act and other statutes; 
2. Failing to recognize that sub-sections (a) through (c) of Utah Code Ann. §38-9-1 (6) 
are stated in the disjunctive, so that a lien filed in breach of any one of those sub-sections 
brings it within the definition of wrongful lien; 
3. Failing to find that crucial admissions by the respondent-appellee Wilshire 
Investments, LLC, conclusively proved that the Wilshire lien at the time of its filing on the 
Andersons' Resort property, was not expressly authorized by statute in that it contained a 
material misstatement of the lien amount, recited a false claim and was groundless. 
In its brief, Appellee Wilshire Investments argues that because Utah Code Ann. §38-
9-l(6)(a) through (c) is written in the disjunctive, a lien that qualifies under any one of those 
sub-sections will not be a wrongful lien, regardless of whether it clearly breaches one of the 
other sub-sections. 
Wilshire also attempts to show to show that key facts asserted by the Appellants were 
disputed and asserts new matters not focused upon by Appellant in its brief: 
i. Wilshire did not have sufficient time to adequately brief and argue before the 
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court below; 
ii. The averments in the affidavits of Marc S. Jenson and Eric Pearson were never 
disputed by Appellants; 
iii. The Appellants' claims under Utah Code Ann. §38-9-4(3) survived the court's 
August 9, 2002 order; 
iv. Russell v. Thomas, 2000 UT App 82, confirms that a trial court hearing a 
wrongful lien summary disposition petition should not look behind the face of 
a lien document to inquire into its bona fides. 
v. The proceeding below was the equivalent of a summary judgment motion and 
no findings of fact were required; 
vi. The Andersons fraudulently failed to disclose the existence of EPA actions 
against their property; 
vii. The Andersons never moved for summary judgment before the court below 
and their request that this court find that they were entitled to summary 
nullification of the Appellee's lien, is a request for summary judgment and so 
improper. 
Another new matter raised by the Appellee's brief is its failure to brief. 
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ARGUMENT 
II. Facts in Issue and Wilshire's conflicting claims 
A. Undisputed and disputed facts 
l.At page 30, line 20, R.269, counsel for Appellee starts to respond to Appellants 
evidence that on August 16, 2001 Marc S. Jenson told the Andersons Wilshire would fund 
the Springs purchase of the Johnson and Hulet properties. Mr. James in part states: 
"And let me just say I have now heard that because we don't dispute, in fact 
we admit. I have heard characterizations of documents that if your Honor will 
read those documents you will see they were mis-characterized. I could spend 
an hour telling you about this transaction. I won't. I will tell you we not only 
disagree, we strongly disagree with Counsel's characterization of what has 
happened in this case." 
2. This is as close as Appellee ever got in argument before the court below to 
disputing the Andersons' claim that Mr. Jenson told them Wilshire would fund the purchase 
of both properties, and that nowhere in his affidavit does he dispute that claim, and in fact 
admits it. Having abandoned argument on this issue in the court below, Appellee cannot now 
raise it with this Court. Pixton v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 809 P.2d 746,751 (Utah Ct. App. 
1991. 
3. The Appellee's in their brief offer contradictory arguments. At page 3 they claim, 
"In exchange for its agreement to loan substantial amounts of money in connection with a 
real estate development in Midway, Utah ... Wilshire ... required and received ... trust deeds 
on the property comprising the development." But in paragraph 7, page 9, of their brief (also 
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in paragraph 6) they argue that there never was any agreement, only a statement of conditions 
that must be fulfilled if the loan was to funded. 
4. At page 4 of their brief, they allege that,"... Wilshire properly and legally recorded 
its lien on the Anderson property." But reference to R.444 ex. S shows that Wilshire, 
through its attorney that handled this transaction on its behalf, disavowed any involvement 
with the recording of that lien. And reference to page 13, paragraph 18 of Appellee's brief 
finds Wilshire disavowing that it ever, "properly and legally recorded its lien on the land." 
5. At page 6 of its brief, Wilshire again asserts that it "vigorously contests" the 
Appellants Statement of Facts, but never specifies how or why. Issues not briefed are 
waived. See Walker v. U.S. Gen., Inc., 916 P.2d 902, 908 (Utah 1996). 
6. In the first paragraph of page 7 of its brief, Appellee alleges, "The Andersons did 
not dispute the material facts that Wilshire presented to the trial court...". Appellee Wilshire 
then proceeds to repeat that statement of facts, which is a paragraph by paragraph restatement 
of the affidavit of Marc S. Jenson found at R. 141-148. Yet paragraph 3 of that restatement 
(page 8 in the Appellee's brief) specifically refers to a dispute with the Andersons over the 
affiliation between the principals of the Springs and the principals of Wilshire. Paragraph 10, 
at page 10 of that brief, also discusses a dispute over the issue of what Mr. Jenson told the 
Andersons. 
7. Paragraphs 11 and 12, at page 11 of Appellee's brief, refers to the affidavit of Eric 
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Pearson. At page 149 to 161 of the Record one finds an affidavit by R. Michael Anderson 
rebutting Mr. Pearson's claims. Obviously, these claims by Wilshire have been disputed. 
Appellee Wilshire refers to the affidavit of Eric Pearson for two propositions: 
i. that on or about April 15 or 16, 2001 this counsel inquired of Mr. Pearson 
whether Wilshire would agree to delay foreclosure on the Anderson property 
until it had first proceeded against the other properties; 
ii. in that same conversation Mr. Pearson told this counsel that any pledge to the 
Andersons of the membership interests in the Springs would have to be 
approved in advance by Wilshire Investments. 
8. Beginning at paragraph 2 of his responsive affidavit (R. 160), R. Michael 
Anderson disposes of Mr. Pearson's claims. Mr. Anderson exhibits telephone records from 
this counsel's office proving that the conversation took place on August 22, 2001 at 5:14 
p.m., not (as vaguely recollected by Mr. Pearson) sometime on August 15 or 16, 2001. 
9. The additional eight or nine days is important. By the time of that telephone 
conversation the Andersons' deed of trust to Wilshire was already deposited into escrow, R. 
Michael Anderson had already had his conversation with Mr. Jenson on August 16,2001 and 
Wilshire had already issued its escrow instructions of August 21 and 22, 2001. Given that 
Mr. Anderson already had Mr. Jenson's assurances of August 16, 2001, there was no point 
in this counsel on August 22,2001 again inquiring of Wilshire as to the order of foreclosure, 
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if that became necessary. 
10. Mr. Anderson avers that this counsel made no such inquiry. 
11. Second, the August 22, 2001 date confirms the reason for that call. Earlier that 
day Mr. Turcotte and Mr. Woodson purportedly granted the Andersons a first position 
security interest in Turcotte and Woodson's membership interests in the Springs of St. Moritz 
Resort, LLC. Later that day this counsel learned from Jay Hulet in Idaho that Turcotte and 
Woodson had almost two weeks before pledged those membership interests to Wilshire 
Investments. This counsel called Mr. Pearson to get a better idea of the nature of that 
competing security interest. 
12. During that conversation Mr. Anderson sat across the desk from this counsel and 
heard his end of the conversation with Mr. Pearson. At no time did this counsel ask Mr. 
Pearson whether the Andersons could also take a security interest in those membership 
interests. There was no need to — it was already a fait accompli. 
13. In any event, Mr. Pearson's affidavit evidence regarding the order of foreclosure 
on properties secured by Wilshire, is irrelevant to the key admission by Mr. Jenson — that 
he did advise R. Michael Anderson that Wilshire must have all three properties to proceed 
against. fl[ 11 @ R. 145) Furthermore, Mr. Pearson's evidence regarding Wilshire's position 
on the Andersons' security interest in the membership interests for the Springs, only helps 
the Andersons' case. When one considers that evidence in conjunction with Mr. Jenson's 
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evidence at paragraph 20 of his affidavit (R. 143), that, "In late August of 2001, Wilshire 
began to suspect that the Springs was not dealing good faith with respect to its compliance 
with the terms of the loan documents and the completeness of its disclosures to Wilshire.", 
the larger picture falls into place. 
14. The more than probable inference is that Wilshire, upon learning of the 
Andersons' security interest in Turcotte and Woodson's membership interests in the Springs, 
of the Andersons' second mortgage on the Hulet property, and of the Andersons' second 
deed of trust on the Johnson property, decided to take action to defeat those security interests. 
It did this by on August 29, 2001 secretly reversing its closing instructions so that the 
purchase of the Johnson property in Utah closed and Wilshire's trust deed on the Anderson's 
property was recorded, while deliberately withdrawing funding for the purchase of the Hulet 
property in Idaho, causing that closing to fail. 
15. Regardless of the inference one takes from Wilshire's secret reversal of its closing 
instructions, by doing this Wilshire denied the Andersons their second mortgage on the Hulet 
property. Without that second mortgage the Andersons, in the event of foreclosure on the 
Resort property, could not use the equity in the Hulet property to either: 
i. obtain funds to take the Wilshire lien off the Andersons' Resort property, or 
ii. force Wilshire to first foreclose on the Hulet property. 
It also meant that the Springs had no equity in the Hulet property with which to obtain 
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construction financing to take out the Wilshire loan and purchase the Andersons' Resort 
property for $9.4 million. 
16. Instead, the Andersons were left with the $4.9 million Wilshire lien on their 
property, which coincidentally corresponded to the Andersons' entire equity in that property. 
So long as the Wilshire lien was on the Resort property, the Andersons had nothing to sell 
and could not sell. Because Wilshire was in second position behind Barnes Bank, it was in 
a prime position to purchase the Andersons' Resort property at foreclosure for less than half 
of the $9.4 million the Springs had been obligated to pay. And because Wilshire was in first 
position on the Johnson property, it also had the ability to also foreclose offsprings from the 
Johnson property and the Andersons second deed of trust from the Johnson property. 
17. Simply by secretly reneging on its commitment to fund the purchase of the Hulet 
property, Wilshire put itself in a position to defeat all of the Andersons' security interests 
which Mr. Jenson complains of in paragraph 20 of his affidavit. (R. 143) If people almost 
always intend the consequences of their actions, then the conclusive inference must be that 
Wilshire intentionally acted to defraud the Andersons. 
18. Paragraph 13 of Appellee's brief at page 11 is directly contested by paragraph 12 
of R. Michael Anderson's affidavit found at R. 439. 
19. Paragraph 16 of Appellee's brief merely recites (as does Mr. Jenson's original 
affidavit) language from the trust deed. The legal effect of that language was never argued 
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by Wilshire before the court below and so has been waived. In any event, at page 30 and 31 
Appellants in their opening brief dispose of this red herring. This brings us to a glaring 
misstatement by Appellee's on an issue central to this entire case. 
20. Mr. Jenson's August 29, 2001 letter to Security Title (R. 335, tab I) in which he 
without notice to the Andersons and with knowledge that they were relying upon those 
representations (R. 143, par. 18), confirms that Mr. Jenson secretly reversed his earlier 
escrow instructions and covertly reneged on his earlier representations to the Andersons that 
Wilshire would require all three properties as collateral. 
21. Now, apparently in an attempt to avoid the obvious legal conclusion that must be 
taken from such evidence, Wilshire actively misrepresents to this Court the contents of its 
second letter of August 21, 2001(R. 350, tab G). At page 13, paragraph 17 of its brief 
Wilshire claims that with that second letter it, "waived the recordation of the Hulet mortgage 
and authorized release of funds ...", thus inviting one to conclude that as of that date, and not 
August 29, 2001, Wilshire had abandoned funding the Springs for its purchase of the Hulet 
property. 
22. Of course, if the second letter reads as misrepresented by Wilshire, then the 
Andersons' August 24,2001 letter not only refers to a release of recording requirements, but 
also to a release of Wilshire's funding commitment in its escrow instructions found in its first 
August 21, 2001 letter. However, Wilshire's second letter of August 21, 2001 refers only 
to the disbursement of funds to Pioneer Title. Pioneer Title was the Idaho title company that 
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was handling the closing on Wilshire's funding of the Springs purchase of the Hulet property. 
Rather than abandoning the funding of the Springs's purchase of the Hulet property, that 
second letter can only be read as affirming that Wilshire, by diverting excess funds from the 
Utah closing to Pioneer Title in Idaho, was in fact proceeding with the loan for the Springs's 
purchase of the Hulet property. 
23. Documents recovered from Pioneer Title by the Andersons show that on August 
22, 2001 (the day after Wilshire's second letter of August 21, 2001) Pioneer Title believed 
that the receipt of funds from Wilshire was so imminent that Pioneer Title went so far as to 
draft a receipt for $1,511,866.00 in funds (the amount to be advanced by Wilshire on the 
Hulet property). Wilshire has never contested these documents. As of August 22, 2001, 
Wilshire was telling everyone in Idaho and Utah that it was proceeding with the funding of 
the Hulet purchase. The Andersons specifically relied upon Wilshire's August 16, 2001 
representations and its August 21 and 22 closing instructions in issuing their August 24,2001 
letter. All of this is undisputed. 
24. But despite the fact that Appellants briefed and argued at length to the contrary, 
Appellee's claim their allegations at paragraph 17, page 13 of their brief are undisputed. 
25. To claim that the facts alleged in paragraph 18 at page 13 of Appellee' brief were 
not disputed by the Appellants is nonsensical. Simply reading Appellants' petition for 
nullification, commencing at paragraph 6, of wrongful lien disproves this claim.(R.9) 
Furthermore, Wilshire itself now claims otherwise. See paragraph 1.4. above. 
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II. Other New Matters 
1. Wilshire now belatedly asserts an issue it never raised before the court below: that 
the summary disposition proceeding did not allow Wilshire adequate opportunity to make its 
case. While this may have been true at the May 8,2002 hearing, it cannot be true of the July 
17,2002 hearing. And arguments not presented to the court below are not before this Court 
on this Appeal. See Pixton v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 809 P.2d 746, 751 (Utah Ct. App. 
1991). 
2. That second hearing was the result of Appellants' Rule 59(a) motion for a new 
trial. Wilshire had almost two months to prepare and submit material for that second hearing. 
Wilshire not only chose to stand pat, providing nothing beyond Marc Jenson's and Eric 
Pearson's initial affidavits and pleadings, it also entirely refused to respond to the 
Appellants' subpoena duces tecum, which for the most part requested documents relating to 
transactions referred to in Marc Jenson's affidavit. Wilshire's conduct stands in direct 
contradiction to its belated claim of lack of opportunity to present material to the court 
below. 
3. Wilshire also make the inconsistent claim that because of its irrefragable 
interpretation of the Wrongful Lien Act, it had no need to respond to Appellants' evidence 
in the court below. 
4. There are other contradictions: In Mr. Jenson's affidavit Wilshire makes specific 
reference to a number of transactions and documents that potentially would prove dispositive 
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of Wilshire's entire case, but it withholds those documents and information relating to those 
documents. (R. 141-148) 
5. Wilshire at page 31 of its brief alleges that the Appellants are asking this Court for 
summary judgment. But at page 21 of its brief it correctly states, "The Andersons' Petition 
sought summary removal of the lien pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §38-9-7." All the 
Appellants' are seeking is a declaration from this Court that the lien should have been 
summarily nullified pursuant to that provision. How Wilshire later comes to the conclusion 
that Appellants are now seeking summary judgment is never made clear and is still unclear. 
In any event, the claim has no rational basis. 
6. In fact, in footnote 3 of their brief (page 27), it is Appellee's that argue cases 
dealing with summary judgment in an attempt to dispute Appellants' claim that the court 
below failed to make appropriate findings of fact. But in a summary disposition proceeding 
under the Wrongful Lien Act a court can weigh the evidence and so Rule 52(a) Ut.R.Civ.P. 
does apply. 
7. At footnote 5 (page 35) of their brief Appellee's assert for the first time that the 
Appellants' "fraudulently misrepresented (or failed to disclose)" the EPA enforcement action 
on the Resort property. Although Mr. Jenson alludes to an EPA action in his affidavit, he 
never makes this claim. (R. 143,TJ20). Not being raised in the court below, Appellee's have 
waived this issue. But the Appellants did address it there, and convincingly disposed of it. 
(R. 430, *U28) This may be why Mr. Jenson in his affidavit laid the blame at the feet of the 
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Springs. 
8. Page 30 of Appellee's brief finds Appellee's claiming that the Appellants' claims 
under Utah Code Ann. §38-9-4(3) survived the court's August 9,2002 order dismissing their 
petition for wrongful lien. Verbal declarations of a court do not survive the court's written 
order. See Evans v. State, 963 P.2d 177, 180 (Utah 1998). In this case the court's written 
ruling substitutes its reference at the hearing to Utah Code Ann. §38-9-4(3) with a reference 
to Utah Code Ann. §38-9-7(4). And in its final order, the court omits even this reference. 
In the result, (R. 304-306) Appellants/Petitioners' wrongful lien claim for summary 
disposition were finally determined. 
9. U.C.A. 38-9-1 et seq sets up a statutory cause of action for wrongful lien. In a 
summary disposition wrongful lien hearing U.C.A. 38-9-7(4) limits the scope of a court's 
jurisdiction to the sole question of whether that lien is wrongful. A court in a summary 
disposition proceeding has but three options: 
i. Remove the lien as wrongful; or 
ii. Dismiss the petition for removal on the merits; or 
iii. Bind the wrongful lien action and the U.C.A. 38-9-4(3) claims over for trial. 
10. By its own terms, dismissal of a petition pursuant to U.C.A. 38-9-7(5)(c) entirely 
extinguishes all claims under the Wrongful Lien Act and finally disposes of all issues that can 
arise under that Act. This is not a case arising under Rule 54(b) of the Ut.R.Civ.P. where 
some claims are left unsettled. The court below, in its final order (as opposed to its prior 
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verbal rulings in open court) disposed of all claims before the Court in that summary 
proceeding. See Shaw v. Layton Constr. Co., 854 P.2d 1033, 1034-36. 
11. If not appealed the court's determination on the Andersons' wrongful lien action 
is conclusive and binding. The entire petition having been dismissed, there is nothing 
further for the court below to adjudicate and nothing further for the Appellants to proceed 
on before that court. Cf. Crosland v. Peck, 738 P.2d 631, 632 (Utah 1987). Any further 
recourse for damages for a wrongful lien is extinguished. Andersons cannot again plead 
wrongful lien as a cause of action in a subsequent pleading. 
12. Yet Wilshire argues that because the court was statutorily limited in the exercise 
of its jurisdiction to whether or not the trust deed in question was a wrongful lien, the 
judgment of that court cannot be final. In essence, they argue that the court's judgment is not 
final as to causes of action that were never plead and were never before it. Simply restating 
this argument makes apparent its error. In any event, this issue was already decided by this 
Court in its ruling on the parties cross-motions for summary disposition. 
13. Next, Appellee's recite two provision from the trust deed at page 33 of their 
brief The second has already been responded to on page 30 of Appellants' initial brief The 
first provision merely recites the purpose of the trust deed. It does not address the issue of 
failure to perform by the Beneficiary, the Appellee Wilshire. Standing alone, it is irrelevant 
to the disposition of any of the issues before this Court. 
14. Finally, in Russell the court looked behind the lien document - a notice of interest 
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— to determine whether the interest in real property recited in that lien was valid. Of course, 
that inquiry was the result of the petitioner affirmatively advising the court that the document 
relied upon by the lienholder was merely a contract for payment on the sale of an interest in 
a real estate purchase contract, which the lienholder had conveyed away prior to filing the 
notice of interest. Because the lienholder had conveyed away its interest in the real estate 
purchase contract, and merely had a contract right for the payment of money, there was no 
interest in land to lien. 
15. This parallels the facts in this case. The Andersons only provided their land as 
security for Wilshire's trust deed because Wilshire represented to the Andersons that it would 
fund the purchase of the Hulet properties. That was the benefit, the consideration for the 
lien. Wilshire's decision (without prior notice to the Andersons) to not advance the $1.5 
million for that purchase, removed any interest it had or could have in the Andersons' land. 
Wilshire was no longer a bona fide purchaser of that interest. Recordation of the Wilshire 
lien without that interest made it groundless and a false claim. 
III. Appellee Wilshire's failure to brief 
Footnote 6 of Appellee's brief contains its response to the cases and authorities, and 
the arguments applying them to the facts of this case, made in Appellants' opening brief. 
The does not constitute adequate briefing and the failure to brief results in the waiver on 
those issues. This includes cases Appellant relies upon to support its construction of the 
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Wrongful Lien Act, the cases and argument showing that equity can operate in a Wrongful 
Lien Act summary proceeding and the cases and authorities showing that conduct of the type 
engaged in by Appellee Wilshire entitles the Appellants' to cancellation of their signatures 
on the trust deed to Wilshire. See Walker @ 908. 
IV. Conclusion 
The above analysis of Mr. Jenson's affidavit, especially paragraph 11 of that affidavit, 
affirms that Mr. Jenson told the Andersons that Appellee Wilshire must have security on all 
three properties, before it would fund the Springs' purchase of the Hulet and Johnson 
properties. Analysis of Wilshire's August 22,2001 escrow instructions confirms that those 
instructions only vary the prior instructions to the extent necessary to facilitate the Springs 
purchase of the Hulet properties. It was not until August 29,2001 that Wilshire, after having 
first dismissed Security Title as the title agent for the Hulet closing in Idaho, secretly 
reversed its escrow instruction. This was five days after the Andersons (in reliance on the 
August 22,2001 Wilshire instructions that no funds be released for the benefit of the closing 
in Utah until the Springs purchase of the Hulet property had been funded by Wilshire), gave 
their August 24,2001 instructions that the Wilshire trust deed could be recorded independent 
of the recording of documents in Idaho. All of these facts are undisputed. Appellant 
Andersons request that this Court declare that as a matter of law that Appellants' were 
entitled to a summary declaration under Utah Code Ann.§3 8-9-7, that the lien on Appellants' 
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real property by the Appellee Wilshire Investments, LLC, was a wrongful lien as defined in 
Utah Code Ann. §38-9-1(6). 
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